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I.

INTRODUCTION

Possible foreign supply interruptions (FSI) provide the basis
for one of

the

recurring arguments

advanced for

intervention of government in the marketplace.

the

In its

simplest form the argument goes that potential foreign supply
interruptions
consequences.

could lead

to

serious

socioeconomic

From this reasoning the intuitive leap is made

that some form of government intervention in the market is
necessary to support high cost, technologically inefficient
domestiG producers over their lower cost foreign competitors.
This

intervention

may

tarriff/non-tariff barrier~.

run

the

whole

gamut of

Historically, this type of

reasoning was behind the Buy Ame.r ican Act, the old U •. s. oi 1
import quotas, and has been used frequently as a justification
for .import-substituting industr:ialization
programs in LDCs.
,,
On the other side of the coin,

the same sort of reasoning on

the part of the supplier has been behind the embargoes of
Rhodesia .and South Africa and President Reagan's embargo of
pipeline parts for the USSR.

Thus what we will be concerned

with here is a rather wide class of related problems found in
the literature on- commercial policy which have a common

For example, John~on (10) addresses· the

~nderlyiig logic.

effect of uncertainty in general on internatiohal trade,
whereas Tolley and Wilman (12) and Mayer (11) pr6~ide mor~
detailed insights on the issues of foreign dependen~e and
nationa1-defense, respectively, and Cox and Wright ( 5) deal
solely with the case of oil.

Bhagwati and Srintvasin (4), on

th~ other hand, examine the issue from the viewpoint of the
And,

foreign supplier facing such pre-emptive restrictions.

still oth·ers such as.Hay -(7) a"t'1d Areskoug (2) ahd the ensuing
literature (see Amacher, _Tollison, and Willett (1), Hay (8),
and Heitmann (9), Areskoug (3), respectively) address only the
issue of· . what is ihe optimal.method and/or
.

level

for

controlli~g imports rather than the question of the rationale
for imposing any control.
While there is some truth to these simple arguments, if
~xtended too far they would lead to virtual autarky.
all,

After

there is no ~uch thing as a 1-00% sure supply &ither

domestic or foreign.

And, any bottleneck resulting. from

a_

supply int~rruptibn will i~pose a cost on some segment ot
society.

Ultimately, the validity of such arguments really

depends upon the values of a number of underlying parameters
that will determine the associated potential costs of
alternative .pqssible -scenarios.

Ano, economic efficiency

requires that in determining tl:)e_optimal policy to follow that
the cost of these different contingencies be compared.

Unfortunately, doing a truly systematic analysis of each·
possible scenario can be quite complicated for the policy
analyst.

And, explaining the results to the politicians who

must make the decisions may be even more difficult.
the simple argument

advanced

As such

earlier frequently goes

unchallenged.
The purpose of this paper is toi, give a brief summary of
the possible arguments in economic theory for the imposition
of such restrictions.

We will critically analyze the basic

issues implicit in all such cases, discuss the circumstances
in which such .arguments may be valid, and draw attention to
the type of factual information that is necessary to make
responsible decisions about trade policy.
facilitate

Ideally, this will

the policy analyst in arriving at the optimum

policy recommendation.

At the least it will help him explain

to the politician that the intuitive argument is too great a
simplification of reality.

II.

FOREIGN SUPPLY INTERRUPTION

Instantaneous Adjustment
Let us begin by considering what is most likely the commonest
case.

Depicted

in

Figure

l

is

the

famiiiar partial

equilibrium diagram representing the case of a price taker
importer in

a

world market with some domestic production and

initially no trade restrictions or foreign supply difficulty.
I

The price line WW

represents the world market supply curve, S

the domestic supply curve, and D the domestic demand curve.
With the given world price we have
demanded 6omestically, 0

8

units

domestically, and the difference

Q

Q

of

0 units of ihe good
the good produced

0 - 0 8 = M units imported.

Now assuming thats and D represent long run situations and
ignoring time, either a total FSI or a prohibitive tariff·or
quota would have the effect of moving the equilibrium_to point
B where we would have autarky price PA and autarky production
and consumption of QA units.
Now it is apparent that QA is the ~ighest level of
domestic production that can be achieved in the absence of a
subsidy.
is,

Q

0 -

It is also apparent that QA is less than Q0 , that
QA= M

represents

the short-fall of domestic

production f-rom the free trade situaiion r&gardless of whether
there is a FSI or prohibitive domestic trade.barrier.

~

Thus M
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- represents the uninsurable loss of units of the good with an
accompanying loss of domestic consumer surplus, of BCE.

Now

II

consider the remainder of the FS, QA - Q = M.

Once again,

regardless of the source of the problem-in the long run
domestic producers can make up· these units so that they are
not lost,

but only at a cost

consumer surplus.

(loss)

of BCG in domestic

Thus with either a total permanent FSI or a

prohibitive domestic trade barrier the long-run costs incurred
by the domestic society can be measured ~y BEG with a loss of
I

M

units of the good.

The difference is that the FSi is

usually not a 100% certainty, and if it occurs, will occur
only at some future date.

The trade barrier, however,

is

proposed for today and if enacted becomes a certainty.
Clearly then for any normal rarige of social time rate of
discount, free trade would be optimal even when faced with a
possible FSI. _

The Role of Adjustment Costs

80 where does the possible validity,

arguments for protection arise?

if there is any, of the
It arises potentially from

our concentration on the long-run time period, or to be more
precise the implicit assumption that we are able to make
long-run adjustments instantaneously and costlessly if a FSI
occurs.

Suppose

instead,

that both domestic producers and

consumers are unable to adjust instantaneously to changes in
the FS, as reflected in Figure 2 by the steeper short-run
I

curves S

and D

intersecting the respective long-run curves

at the pre-FSI levels of production and consumption.
case

if a

In that

FSI were to occur the loss of domestic surplus

during the adjustment period would be represented by EGH which
is substantially greater than the long-run loss of EGB.
Furthermore, assuming that the short-run curves always
intersect the long-run curves at the

initial points of

production and consumption, it is clear that the imposition of
2
a pre- Fsl- tarr1. ff cou ld re d uce t h.1s a d'JUstment cost.

In the

example of Figure 2, with a specific tariff of T per unit the
3
adjustment cost would be reduced to EGKJL • Of course this
tariff would also impose a cost equal to GKN + ELM due to the
inefficiencies in domestic production and domestic consumption
it introduces.
In order to see how all these different costs can be
compared, let us consider a three time period model in which
it is known with certainty that a complete, permanent FSI will
occur at the begining of the second time period and that all
adjustments will be completed by the end of that period.

In

that case the present value of the cost of the FSI in the
absence of a tariff would be given by:
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PV cost FSI = 0 + EGH + EGB
1 +i
( 1 +i) 2
If instead a tariff of Twas imposed at the begining of the
first time pe~iod,

then the present value of the costs

becomes:
PV cost FSI = (GKN + ELM) + EGKJL +
EGB
2
(with tariff)
1 + i
(1--:.=-i)
Whether the

tariff

restricted case is preferable to the

non-tariff case depends on how the present value costs of the
two scenarios compare.

Since after the second period, i.e.-,

once the long-run autarky equilibrium gets established, the
costs are identical under both situations the decision hinges
on whether:
>

EGH .. (GKN +
( 1 +i) <

ELM)

+ EGKJL
(l+i)

or rewriting:
>

EGH - EGKJL
(1

+

i)

f

GKN

+

ELM

i.e~,whether the present value of the adjustment co~t savings
exceeds, equals, or i~ less than the tariff cost.
As hoted in the Introduction, the .resolution of this
problem depends upon the values of a number of underlying
parameters~

What is needed now is to

identify those

parameters and the qualitative role they will play in the
decision ceteris paribus.

Let us begin with an obvious but

frequently ignored variable - the social time rate of discount
4
(i).
Since even in a many time period model, the costs
associated with the tariff must always be incurred before the
adjustment cost savings, it follows that the greate~ is the
value for i the less likely it is that the trade restriction
will prove optimal.

And, although we have considered only a

three time period model, it is a straight forward extension of
the role of i

to note that in a many time period model, the

further in the future is the FSI, the less likely it ls that
·the trade restriction will prove optimal.

Alternately stated,

even in the face of a·certain, complete, future FSI with
domestic adjustment costs, the optimal tariff may still be

Although we have considered a 100% certain F~I, it is
obvious that.a reduction in the probability of the FSI reduces
the expected adjustment cost savings without. affecting the
cost assoc.iated with any tariff.

5

Thus the smaller is the

probabiLity of a FSI, the greater is the likelihood that the
optimal tariff will be zero.

Equally, if the FSI is less than

complete, the smaller is the per~entage of the FS affected,
the smaller will be the expected adjustment cost savings and
the greater will be the likelihood that the optimal tariff is
zero.

Furthermore, the shorter is the duration of the FSI,

the smaller will be -the adjustment co-st savings, .and the
ireater will be ihe,likelihood that the 6ptimal tariff is
zero.

I

"

E'inally, the more pr ice elastic are s - (_S ) and D

I

"

( D- )

_

the less will be the_ .adjustment cost savings associated with
any tariff and hence the more likely that the- optimal tariff
is zero.

This follows-since the tariff costs are dependent
-

6

only on the size· of T and the price _ elasticies of s and D •

III.

CONCLUSION

The potential threat of

a

FSI

is often put

forth as an

Il
'

arg~ment for-th~·imposition of a pre-emptive domestic trade'
_ restriction.

The- validity of such arguments really ·depends

upon a number qf underlying- as.sumptions and the' values of a
number of parameters.

Wha_t we have done ·in this paper i-s ·to

-

try,' using an

-

illustrative model,

to identify what these

assumptions and paramete·rs are and the qualitative role they
play

in th~ deci~ion.

A~

illustrated,

crucial

to

the

jus_tif ication of ·any trade restriction is the existence of
adjustment costs either in te~ms·of do~estic suppliers and/or
domestic consumers.

The validity.of this will obviously vary·

from sector-to-sector, country-to-country, -and time-_to-time. _
An d ,

i s

1i ke1y

t o -b e

a

f unc t i on

0

f

i n f o r ma t i o n ,

entrepr~neurship, and institutional~framewoik.
If these adjustment

costs exist, whether they will

, II

I

justify the

imposition of a

tariff will depend upon the

probability of the expected FSI; when, to what extent, and how
long the FS is interrupted;

the price elasticities of the

short-run domestic supply and demand; and the social time rate
of discount.

Of all of these the latter may be the most

difficult for the policy analyst to determine and yet perhaps
the most important in the decision to restrict trade.

NOTES

1
we could of course pursue the argument in terms of the
two good, small-country, general-equilibrium framework and
arrive at the same conclusions, but the approach adopted here
seems to have heuristic value.

The large-country case is more

interesting, but sti11·a fairly straight-forward extension of
the logic presented here.

It is, however,

important to note

that the optimum tariff from the viewpoint of minimizing FSI
adjustment costs generally will not be the same as the optimum
tariff from the viewpoint of exercising monoposony power.
And, any such difference must be included in the short-run
opportunity cost of any tariff imposed for the former purpose.

2

r;plicit in this,

is the assumption that the tariff

could be phased-in at a

rate consi~tent with domestic

consumers and producers having time to make their adjustment
along the long-run schedules.

3

rt may not at first be evident why the adjustment cost

should be measured as EGKJL rather than simply KJL.

Consider

first the area KLMN which represents the tariff revenue
collected by the domestic government.

Clearly if imports were

to cease this revenue would be lost and thus it is a cost of
the FSI.

Now GMN and ELM represent the inefficiency costs of

I
I
I

I
I

the tariff that are already being incurred on the prematurely
over-stimulated Sand the under-stimulated D and are really
independent of the

FSI in the sense that they would be

incurred even without the FSI.

Nonetheless,

since they

represent a deviation between the present case and the
free-uninterrupted trade situation they must be included in
the present period's costs.

4
A good discussion of the importance of this variable and
how one might determine it is provided in (6, Chapter 13).
This work also provides a very good review of cost-benefit
analysis in general.
:

5

we are assuming that the probability of a FSI

independent of the imposition of a tariff.

is

If, however, the

probability of a FSI is a function of the level of the tariff
this would not necessarily follow.

It is not clear a priori,

however, what the qualitative direction of such a function
would be.

One could argue that the imposition of a tariff to

the extent it reduces domestic dependency on the FS reduces
the probability of a FSI. However, since most FSI seem to be
politically motivated,
imposition of a

tariff

retaliatory embargo.

one could also argue

that the

increases the probability of a

1

6

Both the tariff costs and the adjustment cost savings

will depend on the magnitude of the price elasticities of S
and D and in the same way.

Thus a priori it is impossible to

arrive at any qualitative conclusion as to the role that they
will play in determining the optimal tariff.
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